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Abstract 
In the present paper, we propose a reformulation of the libertarian theory of bribery, particularly of 
Rothbard's account of the briber as an innocent inciter to crime. We discern an incompatibility between 
Rothbard’s theories of bribery and incitement and side with the latter. This philosopher-economist 
maintains that only the bribee, not the briber, is guilty of criminal behavior; and also, that while incitement 
should be legal, aiding and abetting people into committing a crime should be considered illicit in law. 
But, the briber, in our view, does not merely limit himself to inciting the bribee, he actually aids and abets 
him. The briber exceeds the role of a mere inciter because he not only exercises his rights of free speech 
but also pays the bribee for violating the employment contract. Therefore, Rothbard's criterion for being 
merely an innocent inciter, i.e. that the inciter has nothing further to do with the criminal activities he 
incited others to perform, is not fulfilled in the case of the briber who also pays the bribee for the contract 
violation. 
Keywords: Bribery; incitement; libertarianism 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A standard, Rothbardian formulation of the 
libertarian theory of bribery says that paying a 
bribe is a kind of discount on goods and services 
or a rebate paid by the briber to the bribee. 
Therefore, according to this formulation, “there is 
nothing illegitimate about the briber” and so “there 
should be a property right to pay a bribe” 
(Rothbard 1998, p. 129).  
In the present paper, we claim that this account is 
untenable, particularly that it contradicts the 
Rothbardian theory of the limits of free speech and 
crime. Contrary to his account, we argue that in 
the case of bribery which involves a violation of an 
employment contract on the part of the bribee, not 
only the bribee but also the briber commits a 
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crime. To justify our position, we propose to look 
at bribery from the vantage point of the incitement1 
to crime and particularly from the perspective of a 
crucial distinction between being a mere inciter on 
the one hand and being a person implicated in 
crime (a criminal) on the other. We argue therefore 
that Rothbardian interpretation of paying a bribe 
as a legitimate practice of lowering the price is 
unsound and inconsistent with other elements of 
his own theory. Abandoning this interpretation, we 
make a case for interpreting bribe paying as a 
complicity in crime on the part of the briber, viz. as 
a violation of property rights that should be 
considered illegal and punished accordingly. By 
making our point we hope to slightly refine an 
otherwise magnificent theory of Murray 
Rothbard’s and to contribute to the advancement 
of the libertarian political philosophy. 
In section 2 we discuss Bribery and Title-Transfer 
Theory of Contracts. Section 3 is given over to our 
analysis of Bribery and Incitement to Crime. The 
burden of section 4 is deal with Incitement and 
Complicity. In section 5 we confront Paying a Bribe 
as Complicity in Crime. We deal with an objection 
to our thesis in section 6 and conclude in the 
section 7. 
2. BRIBERY AND TITLE-TRANSFER 
THEORY OF CONTRACTS 
Per Rothbard, there is one and only one scenario 
in which bribery involves illegality: when, because 
of a bribe which he accepts, the bribee violates the 
employment contract with the owner of the 
company he works for. Rothbard writes (1998, p. 
129):   
“Suppose that Black wants to sell materials to 
the XYZ Company. In order to gain the sale, 
he pays a bribe to Green, the purchasing 
agent of the company. It is difficult to see what 
Black has done which libertarian law should 
consider as illegal. In fact, all he has done is 
to lower the price charged to the XYZ 
Company by paying a rebate to Green. From 
Black's point of view, he would have been just 
as happy to charge a lower price directly, 
though presumably, he did not do so because 
                                                     
1 For other libertarian analyses of incitement, see Block 
(2011; 2012); O’Neill and Block (2013). For a debate on 
this matter, see Mortellaro (2009) and Block (2009). 
the XYZ executives would still not have 
purchased the materials from him. But the 
inner workings of the XYZ Company should 
scarcely be Black's responsibility. As far as he 
is concerned, he simply lowered his price to 
the Company, and thereby gained the 
contract. The illicit action here is, instead, 
solely the behavior of Green, the taker of the 
bribe. For Green's employment contract with 
his employers implicitly requires him to 
purchase materials to the best of his ability in 
the interests of his company. Instead, he 
violated his contract with the XYZ company 
by not performing as their proper agent: for 
because of the bribe he either bought from a 
firm which he would not have dealt with 
otherwise, or he paid a higher price than he 
need have by the amount of his rebate. In 
either case, Green violated his contract and 
invaded the property rights of his employers. 
In the case of bribes, therefore, there is 
nothing illegitimate about the briber, but there 
is much that is illegitimate about the bribe, the 
taker of the bribe. Legally, there should be a 
property right to pay a bribe, but not to take 
one. It is only the taker of a bribe who should 
be prosecuted.” 
Rothbard's claim finds its justification in the title-
transfer theory of contracts which says that for a 
contract to bind, there must be a property title that 
one party conditionally transfers to the other party 
so if the other party does not fulfill his contractual 
obligations, he finds himself in illegitimate 
possession of this property. A violation of a binding 
contract constitutes, therefore, an implicit theft: “In 
short, a contract should only be enforceable when 
the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. 
But this can only be true if we hold that validly 
enforceable contracts only exist where title to 
property has already been transferred, and 
therefore where the failure to abide by the contract 
means that the other party's property is retained 
by the delinquent party, without the consent of the 
former (implicit theft)” (1998, p. 133).  
In the case of bribery, a crime committed by the 
bribee consists thus exactly in this implicit theft: by 
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violating the employment contract, the bribee 
becomes an illegitimate possessor of the 
employer's property2. Analytically speaking, what 
is then a core of the bribee’s crime is not the fact 
that he accepts a bribe and privately pockets it 
(there is nothing inherently wrong with accepting 
money or other goods from people outside the 
employment contract) but that he violates his 
employment contract, although he does it because 
of a bribe. It can be the case that because of a 
bribe the bribee favors an offer which is worse for 
his employer than other offers submitted to the 
company; it can also be the case that he favors an 
offer that is the best for his employer but by the 
very fact of accepting a bribe, the offer is then 
more expensive for the employer than it could 
have been if bribery had not occurred. This point 
is further supported by Rothbard's remarks on 
bribing the very owner of the company, in which 
case, “there would have been no violation of 
anyone's property right and therefore properly no 
question of illegality” (1998, p. 130).3 
In the remainder of our paper, we focus exclusively 
on a scenario in which bribery involves illegality 
(viz. when because of a bribe the bribee commits 
an implicit theft4 by violating the employment 
contract) and within the purview of this scenario 
we scrutinize the role of the briber.5  
                                                     
2 In effect, the employer's money. That is to say, in the 
absence of this theft on the part of the bribee, the 
employer, the owner, of the XYZ company would 
have ended up with the money that Black, the briber 
paid to Green, the bribee. If we eliminate the “middle 
man” Black, then Green stole from XYZ.  
3  That is to say, suppose Black bribed not Green, the 
employee of XYZ, but the latter directly. Then, there 
would have been nothing untoward about the 
commercial interaction. We would be hard put, even, 
to consider this a ”bribe” at all. For, what is the 
difference between a bribe and a voluntary 
payment? The former must be in at least some way, 
illicit, or at least questionable, while the latter is not. 
4  Perhaps ”indirect theft” would be more accurate.  
5  From this point on any time we talk about bribery we 
mean this and only this scenario. 
6We could perhaps extrapolate to other contracts, 
although this is not usually done. Suppose Mr. Smith 
3. BRIBERY AND INCITEMENT TO 
CRIME 
As we pointed out above, bribery and its illegality 
consist in a violation of an employment 6 contract 
by an employee (a bribee) who prefers to accept 
this payment than to abide by the contract. If that 
is the case – and we have seen that it is with no 
doubts the case for Rothbard – what then is the 
point of the potential briber's actions? The 
potential briber, Black, tries to persuade an 
employee of the XYZ company, Green, to accept 
his business offer even though from the point of 
view of Green's employer it is a worse offer than 
those submitted by Black's competitors.7 Black 
tries to persuade Green to become a bribee, i.e. to 
violate the employment contract and to accept 
Black's offer, contrary to Green's employer's best 
interest but to the advantage of Black, the briber. 
In a word, Black tries to incite Green to commit a 
crime: Go! Violate Contract! Implicitly Steal! 
Paying a bribe is, therefore, better characterized 
as an incitement to crime rather than as paying a 
rebate.8 First of all, because paying a rebate is just 
one amongst many possible ways of persuading a 
buyer to make a purchase, it can be subsumed 
under the general term of persuading a buyer. 
Second, because the specific point of persuasion 
in the case of bribery is to encourage an employee 
of a given company to commit a crime, this kind of 
persuasion can be specified not merely as an 
incitement to crime, but as actively engaging, 
participating, in it.9 
bribes Mrs. Jones to go to bed with him. The latter 
has no employer from whom she can be stealing 
money as in the Rothbardian example. However, 
she does have a husband, Mr. Jones, from whom 
she is stealing something (maybe even money, who 
knows, as in the case of pimping), perhaps honor. In 
any case, she is violating some agreement, at least 
in the case of monogamous marriage. 
7  Black’s comparative advantage over his competitors 
is that he is willing to bribe Green, while they are not. 
8  Both are accurate. But in the present context, we are 
accusing Black not of merely inciting Green to 
commit a crime, but of actively aiding and abetting 
him to do so, by paying him for this service. Block 
(2012) levels a similar accusation against Spike Lee. 
9  The taxi driver who unwittingly and unknowingly 
transports the robber gang to the bank, or the 
restaurant that sells them lunch, and the shoe store 
that sells them their footwear (assuming all these 
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If that were the end of the story, Rothbard's 
position that “there is nothing illegitimate about the 
briber” and so “there should be a property right to 
pay a bribe”, would be saved, though slightly 
reformulated, because there is nothing wrong with 
inciting to crime – the inciter just enjoys his right to 
free speech. As Rothbard put it: “Should it be 
illegal, we may inquire, to 'incite to riot'? Suppose 
that Green exhorts a crowd: Go! Burn! Loot! Kill! 
And the mob proceeds to do just that, with Green 
having nothing further to do with these criminal 
activities. Since every man is free to adopt or not 
adopt any course of action he wishes, we cannot 
say that in some way Green determined the 
members of the mob to their criminal activities; we 
cannot make him, because of his exhortation, at 
all responsible for their crimes. 'Inciting to riot', 
therefore, is a pure exercise of a man's right to 
speak without being thereby implicated in crime” 
(1998, p. 81). By the same token, it seems that 
Black, the briber, does just this, namely exercises 
his freedom of speech by adding just one more cry 
to Rothbardian Green's exhortations: Go! Burn! 
Loot! Kill! Implicitly Steal! The problem is though 
that it is not the end of the story. 
4. INCITEMENT AND COMPLICITY 
According to Rothbard (1998, p. 81), there is a 
difference between merely inciting to commit a 
crime and actually committing one. He expresses 
this difference as a proviso saying that it is legal to 
incite to crime only as far as the inciter has 
“nothing further to do with these criminal 
activities”. Within these limitations, the inciter 
simply enjoys his right to free speech. Otherwise 
and outside these boundaries he is no longer a 
mere inciter but a person implicated in the crime, 
in a word, a criminal. From Rothbard's point of 
view, inciting to crime “is a pure exercise of a 
man's right to speak without being thereby 
implicated in the crime. On the other hand, it is 
obvious that if Green happened to be involved in 
a plan or conspiracy with others to commit various 
                                                     
services are necessary for the crime), are innocent, 
as is Rothbard’s mere inciter. But the getaway 
driver, the cook and the quartermaster who are all 
members of the gang and share in its spoils even 
though they do not pull any triggers, are guilty as is 
the person who aids and abets the mob, not only by 
shouting “Go! Burn! Loot! Kill!” at them, but by giving 
crimes, and that then Green told them to proceed, 
he would then be just as implicated in the crimes 
as are the others – more so, if he were the 
mastermind who headed the criminal gang. This is 
a seemingly subtle distinction which in practice is 
clear-cut – there is a world of difference between 
the head of the criminal gang and a soap-box 
orator during a riot; the former is not, properly, to 
be charged simply with 'incitement'” (1998, p. 81). 
There is no doubt that if Green paid someone to 
commit a crime, Green would not be a mere inciter 
but would have something further to do with this 
crime and in this manner, would himself be a 
criminal. Consider the contract-killing case. If 
Green paid Black, a contract killer, to murder 
Green's wife and Black did it, Green not only 
incited Black to commit a crime but also and most 
of all contracted him to do it, i.e. he transferred a 
property title to his money in exchange for Black's 
service10. One cannot justify a claim that Green 
merely said something (“Go! Kill my wife!”) and 
had nothing further to do with the murder of his 
spouse, since he both said something (Go! Kill!) 
and paid Black to do it, which is literally a definition 
of “having something further to do with these 
criminal activities”. Therefore, Green is not a mere 
inciter but an accomplice.  
5. PAYING A BRIBE AS COMPLICITY 
IN CRIME 
Having prepared grounds and crucial distinctions, 
we are now able to conclude our argument. As we 
put it above, the briber tries to incite an employee 
of a given company to violate an employment 
contract and accept the briber's offer contrary to 
the company's best interests. In a word, the briber 
tries to incite the employee to commit a crime. 
Unfortunately for Rothbard's position, this 
classification of a briber as an inciter is only a first 
approximation. If we look at the crucial distinction 
between merely inciting to crime and having 
something further to do with it, i.e. cooperating 
with others to commit a crime, we clearly see that 
them an address of the target, as in the case of 
Spike Lee, or by paying them to do so, as does the 
briber in our example. 
10 Of course, this contract cannot be valid on 
libertarian grounds, since Black does not have a 
right to provide Green with such a service 
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the briber has crossed the border of freedom of 
speech and mere incitement and entered the 
purview of complicity in the crime. For it is 
obviously false that the briber has “nothing further 
to do with these criminal activities” that are 
committed by the bribee. Quite to the contrary, the 
briber both incites and pays the bribee to commit 
a crime of implicit theft – and this is literally a 
paradigm case of “having something further to do 
with these criminal activities”. The briber is 
implicated in the crime and can be properly 
classified as an accomplice. The full analogy is 
therefore not with the mere incitement to crime, let 
alone with paying a rebate or lowering the price 
but rather with a contract killing. Green contracting 
Black to murder Green's wife and Green bribing 
Black to implicitly steal is philosophically 
indistinguishable: he pays an executant to commit 
a crime. 
Hence, Rothbard's analysis of paying a bribe in 
terms of lowering the price is inconsistent with his 
theory of crime and freedom of speech, 
particularly with his account of the difference 
between inciting to crime on the one hand and 
being implicated in crime on the other. 
Consequently, his conclusions that “there is 
nothing illegitimate about the briber” and so “there 
should be a property right to pay a bribe” are 
untenable. What is illegitimate about the briber, is 
a fact that he cooperates in crime with the bribee 
and so there cannot be a property right to pay a 
bribe. Such a “right” would contradict other, true 
property rights. Therefore, from a libertarian point 
of view paying a bribe when it involves a contract 
violation on the part of the bribee is, contrary to 
what Rothbard said, a crime that should be 
prosecuted and punished accordingly. 
6. AN OBJECTION 
The following is a slightly edited version of a 
response to an earlier version of the present paper 
written by an eminent libertarian philosopher11:  
“I don't agree that you have come up with a valid 
criticism of Murray Rothbard. You are right that 
there is tension between holding that bribery 
shouldn't be illegal and holding that incitement to 
commit a crime should not be legal. Your mistake, 
                                                     
11 Who shall remain anonymous 
12 We, as libertarian followers of Rothbard,  
as I see it, is to take Rothbard to hold that 
incitement should not be legal. You have misread 
the relevant passage from Chapter 12 of Ethics of 
Liberty, which is this: 
"Should it be illegal, we may next inquire, to ‘incite 
to riot’? Suppose that Green exhorts a crowd: ‘Go! 
Burn! Loot! Kill!’ and the mob proceeds to do just 
that, with Green having nothing further to do with 
these criminal activities. Since every man is free 
to adopt or not adopt any course of action he 
wishes, we cannot say that in some way Green 
determined the members of the mob to their 
criminal activities; we cannot make him, because 
of his exhortation, at all responsible for their 
crimes. ‘Inciting to riot,’ therefore, is a pure 
exercise of a man's right to speak without being 
thereby implicated in the crime. 
“On the other hand, it is obvious that if Green 
happened to be involved in a plan or conspiracy 
with others to commit various crimes, and that 
then Green told them to proceed, he would then 
be just as implicated in the crimes as are the 
others — more so, if he were the mastermind who 
headed the criminal gang. This is a seemingly 
subtle distinction which in practice is clear-cut — 
there is a world of difference between the head of 
a criminal gang and a soap-box orator during a 
riot; the former is not, properly to be charged 
simply with ‘incitement.’ 
“You have wrongly taken ‘Go! Burn! Loot! Kill! 
Implicitly Steal!’ from this passage to indicate that 
Rothbard is in favor of making incitement illegal. In 
fact, as the context makes clear, he is rejecting this 
view.” 
We the present authors cannot see our way clear 
to agreeing with this criticism of our paper. In our 
view, this eminent libertarian philosopher is correct 
in seeing a “tension” between these two views of 
Rothbard, but he does not realize that this really 
constitutes a deep chasm, that is, a logical 
contradiction. Rothbard cannot be allowed to have 
it both ways. He may not, on the one hand, claim 
that while incitement should be legal12 actively 
taking part in a crime should not be, and on the 
other hand maintaining that the briber is limited to 
exhortation. No, the briber pays the bribee to 
 
certainly agree with him on that. 
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engage in illicit behavior, in much the same way 
as does the husband who wants his wife 
murdered, financially compensates the contract 
killer.  
The second error of this critic is thinking that we 
the present authors “…take Rothbard to hold that 
incitement should not be legal.” We do not for a 
moment write in that vein. Very much to the 
contrary, we interpret Rothbard’s clear statements 
to the effect that incitement should be legal to 
mean precisely that: to wit, that incitement should 
be legal. We have no quarrel with that, none 
whatsoever. However, this anonymous critic fails 
to acknowledge that Rothbard also maintains that 
going beyond incitement, to actively engaging in 
criminal activity by not only incitement but also by 
paying off the criminal, by having “something 
further to do with” the crime should not be legal.13 
7. CONCLUSION 
In the present paper, we proposed a reformulation 
of the libertarian theory of bribery. We argued that, 
contrary to what Rothbard says, the briber is not 
an innocent inciter to crime but rather an aider and 
abettor. We showed that the Rothbardian criterion 
for being a mere inciter is not fulfilled in the case 
of the briber who by paying the bribee to violate 
the employment contract, obviously has 
something further to do with the violation. Although 
we appreciate Rothbard’s (1998) attempt to 
defend the briber, but not the bribee, we claim that 
this distinction fails, based on his brilliant 
distinction between incitement, which, 
surprisingly, should be legal, and aiding and 
abetting, or, having “something further to do with,” 
the crime, which should not be legal. 
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